Abstract Since the economic and managerial fields integrated the Internet tool, new opportunities were created. Among them, information management aiming at helping to make the "best choices" became a central topic in e-management. New types of intermediaries appeared in the virtual world. Actors who join these intermediation places and take part in their development play an atypical game: on the one hand, they cooperate in the same virtual entity of reticular form and, on the other hand, they remain individually in competition with one another since they are active on the same market. How should we address this competitive game? As an answer to the latter question, we suggest to rely on coopetition theory to describe the collaboration between members of a same platform. Moreover, in order to avoid any confusion, we propose a distinction between 'electronic marketplaces' and 'online information platforms'. To illustrate our work we apply our general analysis to the case of e-tourism.
Introduction
The integration of the Internet within human organizations and, in particular, in the mechanisms of business administration has already caused multiple organizational changes. Some economic actors disappeared while other actors appeared because of the opportunities created by the Internet and, in a more general way, by the revolution associated with the information and communication technologies (ICT).
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we replace the concept of electronic platforms in its context, namely the context of market intermediation. We contrast the hypotheses of disintermediation and reintermediation; we describe how infomediation is a concept that rises directly from the re-intermediation concept and, thereby, we explain why it is necessary to distinguish between EMPs and OIPs. In Section 3, we study the collaboration paradox on a platform by referring to the concept of coopetition, which combines competition and cooperation. In Section 4, we formalize the intuitions drawn from the previous sections by developing an industrial organization model. Finally, we conclude by a discussion of our paper and we state a number of important issues for future research.
Intermediation and ICT
In order to understand the implications of the distinction between an EMP and an OIP, it is necessary to refer to the intermediation theory. Actually, these virtual entities are intermediaries whose roles rise directly from the evolution of the intermediation in parallel with the evolution of ICTs over the last decades [14] .
An intermediary is an economic agent who helps a supplier/seller and a buyer/ consumer to meet and to carry out a particular transaction, either by buying to the supplier in order to resell to the purchaser, or by simply helping these two protagonists to find each other [33] . Let us notice that in both cases, the intermediary does not derive any utility from the consumption of the exchanged goods [8] . His profit either comes from the margin of its buy and resell operations or is represented by the wage for his intermediation role. The work of an intermediary generally leads to a centralized offer by minimizing search costs for the two parts of the transaction [31] .
The disintermediation hypothesis
With the development of ICT and more specifically the Internet, the traditional intermediary enters reluctantly in direct competition with decentralized electronic exchanges where consumers and producers meet in order to negotiate directly the final prices and the transaction terms. The Internet is thus perceived as a virtual tool that establishes direct relations between suppliers and consumers. Hence, the disintermediation hypothesis supposing a gradual elimination of the various actors of the value chain [24] .
However, there are several reasons for which this hypothesis cannot be validated in its extreme version (disappearance of any economic actor acting as an intermediary). Firstly, it is difficult to believe in a completely digitalized market because of technological barriers. Undeniably, the current state of technology does not make it possible to find satisfactory electronic equivalent for all types of transactions. Secondly, the concerned actors may not always find it beneficial to make the transactions become entirely electronic, be it for strategic reasons or even to ensure that information remains private [9] . Finally, the producer is not always able to ensure a routing of his products towards the purchaser. Indeed, even if negotiations, contractual agreement and invoicing (electronic payment) can be made digital, the routing of the product remains a material problem. As reminded by Brousseau [9] , the space proximity and the physical meeting between protagonists thus remain significant.
Consequently, the disintermediation hypothesis is not entirely justified since it is stated only in terms of cost reduction (transaction costs theory), without tackling the question of the added value of intermediation [6] and the role of the intermediary as an economic agent [34] .
From electronic intermediation to infomediation
The previous analysis leads us to conclude the following: while it is clear that the existence of the intermediaries is not threatened, it is also clear that their role has to change considerably [4] . Consequently, one can expect an adaptation of the traditional intermediaries to the new needs generated by the information society, but also the emergence of new virtual actors with a tendency to exploit specific niches [9] .
The so-called re-intermediation hypothesis finds its roots in the latter observation. It comes as a reaction to the preceding disintermediation theory, which is considered as too peremptory and not realistic enough. Behind the re-intermediation term thus hides the electronic intermediation which, as we mentioned earlier, is inherent in various electronic platforms [10] . Electronic intermediaries turn out to be essential from a strategic point of view because information on the Internet reaches an extreme level of complexity (in quantitative as well as qualitative terms). The latter finding casts serious doubts on the earlier argument according to which the Internet minimizes search costs [19] . In addition, electronic intermediaries represent a significant medium for firms confronted with an increasingly uncertain environment, as it allows sharing information in a very short period of time [5] . An EMP is defined as an interorganizational information system that allows and facilitates Internet-based commercial relationships among multiple buyers and sellers [1] . So, EMPs might be considered as virtual shopping malls and in the existing literature it is usual to find EMPs and OIPs used as synonyms [6] . However, we wish here to establish a distinction between these two virtual entities.
At first glance, OIPs and EMPs seem to be relatively similar since both are electronic places that provide higher market-exposure to the seller and attract a great number of buyers. Nevertheless, their roles are quite different. On the one hand, EMPs act as traditional intermediaries, which means that they do not just play a role of matching both sides of the market. They also provide a complete service from the beginning to the finalization of the transaction, so that both sides never enter directly in contact. For providing this service, EMPs generally charge a com- Fig. 1.1 Differences between EMP and OIP mission, which represents transaction costs and a profit margin. On the other hand, OIPs only play an information role. They do not care whether the transaction works successfully out, but they improve coordination between the two sides of the market, allowing buyers and sellers to manage the whole transaction by themselves. In this latter case, it is not longer possible for the infomediary to control transactions, so that they prefer to charge one or both sides of the market with a fixed fee [36] .
So, while an EMP clearly allows participants to trade directly, the OIP only aims at providing information [32] .
In the present article, we refer to an OIP as any system whose objective is to collect the information available on particular products and services in order to present it in a comprehensive, organized, synthetic and easily accessible form, to the attention of the buyer. Consequently, it represents an information tool and not a transaction tool, as is the case for an EMP. An OIP can thus be considered as a type of innovating intermediary thanks to which information gains in credibility [27] . To support this terminological differentiation, the literature has coined the term of infomediary [26] , which usefully characterizes an OIP. An infomediary is traditionally defined as a merchant of information. This information concerns either the buyer or the supplier of goods and services. In the first case, the infomediary collects data concerning a particular population of buyers, it analyses and structures this data to obtain useful information that it then sells to a supplier, which is directly concerned with the population and the corresponding market. Hence, the infomediary in contact with the market follows the evolution and the tendency of this market and contributes to a certain extent to the development of the offer [19] . In the second case, the infomediary collects data about multiple producers and suppliers of the same good or service in order to propose this information to the potential buyers present on this market segment and requesting a high degree of transparency and comparability of information. Figure 1 .1 presents the most outstanding differences between an EMP and an OIP as we conceive them here. This shows that these two different platforms do not respond to identical needs. Actually, an EMP is more specifically addressed to a supplier who wants to outsource his sale function, whereas an OIP responds to a promotion need. Hence, while a supplier who is not able -or does not want-to ensure transactions tends to join an EMP, a supplier who is not able -or does not want-to ensure its promotion function tends to join an OIP. 1 For infomediation to exist, it is necessary that the activity add some value, exactly as for traditional intermediation. If information relates to the buyer side, there is room for an infomediary only if the supplier is not able to observe, to collect and to treat the data itself. If information relates to the seller side, the infomediation activity is useful if it is difficult for a buyer to observe the whole supply of goods and services. The latter situation can be attributed to various reasons: very fragmented market, difficult access to information, lack of time, consumer not very inclined to support the search costs, etc.
In the e-Tourism sector, lots of websites are OIPs 2 . Information concerns the supply of tourism services as noted above and is proposed to people organizing a city trip or any other kind of holiday. It is useful to recall that the tourism sector benefits considerably from the possibilities offered by the Internet [29] [12] . Indeed, a large range of transactions related to the tourism sector is nowadays very common (buying plane tickets on the web; participating to holidays online auctions; searching sunny destinations on the web instead of using paper catalogues; etc). In such a context, the presence of an OIP can therefore prove to be necessary and justified [16] .
EMPs can also be identified in the tourism sector as electronic travel agencies on which it is possible to choose a product, to carry out the reservation, and even to secure the payment of the stay by electronic payment. 3 As for the case of traditional agencies, they are remunerated on the basis of a commission, which is generally directly integrated by marking up the basic price of the product established by the supplier. Contrary to the information platform, the booking platform does not support informational transparency. Firstly, regarding product information, we note that EMPs do not post the real prices of the products or services: prices include an additional fee (the commission) that is meant to compensate the EMP for its services. Secondly, regarding information about suppliers, travel agencies maintain it secret in order to prevent buyers from directly contacting suppliers and thereby, bypassing the EMP's intermediation process. Indeed, an increasing number of suppliers are equipped in computer systems, which allows them to manage themselves the requests and services related to the booking. Figure 1 .2 summarizes our comparison between EMP and OIP. We now turn to the analysis of the relationships between participants in the same platform. 
Coopetition on an electronic platform
Before analyzing the links existing between platform participants, we will first see why these different actors join an OIP or an EMP. As for a buyer, the benefit of joining an electronic platform is twofold. Firstly, the buyer has access to a large number of suppliers in a single place, which clearly reduces his search costs. Indeed, as we mentioned before, the profusion of information currently available on the Internet does not make it possible any more to consider this medium of communication as a low search cost tool. Let us notice that if the monetary cost has strongly dropped (because telecommunication tariffs have been in constant fall over the last years and also because of the emergence of free online communication tools), the search cost due to the constant growth of the mass of information on the Internet appreciably increased. 4 Secondly, the buyer is confronted with information coming straight from the supplier, which guarantees prices that are not skewed by a commissioning mechanism and also a direct bond with the supplier to start a transaction. Concerning the supplier, his interest is economic as well as strategic. The economic advantage stems from the fact that by joining a platform the supplier partly externalizes his promotion function to an agent, which carries it out at a lower cost (economies of scale) and facilitates coordination between the two sides of the market. Participating in an electronic platform also yields strategic benefits as it allows the supplier to access new markets and thus to gain new market shares at the expense of suppliers who remain outside the network [6] . However, the supplier who joins an EMP or an OIP is forced to share these competitive advantages with the rival suppliers who already joined the platform.
In her work about EMPs, Benda identifies three types of suppliers on the basis of their perception of the stakes they have in the collaboration: refractories, non refractories and proactives [6] . Instead of giving a formal definition for each category, we adapt it hereafter to our e-Tourism framework.
Refractory suppliers are not present on a platform because they consider that their own online promotion methods or their other advertising campaigns are largely sufficient. In the majority of the cases, these suppliers ensure an effective presence on the Internet by using their advanced competences in computer science. By doing this and despite lower means than those implemented by the intermediary, they attract enough visitors to be satisfied.
Non refractory suppliers are participating in the platform as long as their participation in it gets them a higher turnover. Moreover, they require that the profits be higher than the cost of participation. If the intermediary is in its development stage, such suppliers minimize their participation (for example by subscribing to a free trial promotion) while waiting to see whether the platform's development will be beneficial for them or not.
Proactive suppliers are also on the platform. They consider that it can help them at various levels. Firstly, they are convinced that as an actor of the tourism sector, a successful presence on the Internet is essential. Secondly, they find the intermediary useful to benefit from a virtual quality window, which will give a positive image of their services. Thirdly, they note an increase of their sales, even if it is difficult to quantify these repercussions.
Whether they are non-refractory or proactive, suppliers collaborate in the construction and the development of the electronic platform simply through their participation in it. From this point of view, it seems correct to say that they act like partners pursuing a common goal: the mutualisation of means in order to conquer a larger share of the market. However, from the fact that these suppliers propose services and products relating to the same sector, there exists a possibility of comparability. They remain thus also competitors. We wish to underline the paradoxical character of an ambivalent relationship between several suppliers active on the same market, which can be established conceptually in two steps: initially, cooperation between economic agents to achieve a satisfactory common goal for all (in the present case, an increase in the market size); then, competition between the same agents in order to enjoy individually the benefits of the cooperation (here, the largest possible share of the market).
Such a competing collaboration is usually justified by three goals: the research of a critical size, the mutualization of costs and the introduction of barriers for new entrants [34] . For the tourism sector facing globalization, the research of a critical size is fundamental. In a context of global competition, it is easy to understand that cost mutualization appears as a natural way to a widened and effective action. Lastly, given that the sector under review remains largely open (the leisure and accommodation supply increases significantly every year), the participation to an electronic platform can, from a strategic point of view, be used to minimize strong competition by establishing barriers to entry.
The main characteristic of the coopetition phenomenon [22] is to combine simultaneously a collective strategy (cooperation, i.e. participation to the same platform and contribution of each supplier to the development of this platform) and several individual strategies (competition as the participants to the same platform remain competitors with one another) [25] [7] . Coopetition is a helpful theory to analyze tourism economics and strategy. Moreover, the concept has been recently used in the case of tourism firms [28] [15] . as he benefits alone from the entire common infrastructure created. However, it is obvious that for this participation to be transformed into a durable competitive advantage, it is necessary that the intermediary gives itself the means of being known on the buyers' side. Lastly, as we already described it, if both suppliers join the platform, they play the ambivalent game of coopetition: competition is strong because suppliers are on an equal foot, but joint participation makes the platform more attractive for buyers, which increases expected profits for both suppliers. In the next section, we develop an industrial organization model to formalize this situation.
A formal model of coopetition on a platform
To analyze the strategic interaction between an intermediary holding a virtual platform and its potential adherents, we consider the following three-stage game: in the first stage, the intermediary sets a registration fee F that suppliers must pay to use its services; in the second stage, the suppliers observe F and simultaneously decide whether or not to register with the intermediary; in the third stage, the suppliers simultaneously choose the quantity of services they provide. We solve the game backwards for its subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
To get the main insights from the modelization, we start with a simplified situation with only two suppliers of accommodation. Next, we generalize our results assuming an arbitrary number of suppliers.
A model with 2 suppliers
Suppose there are two suppliers of accommodation, noted 1 and 2, and a single intermediary. The inverse demand function for the service provided by supplier i is given by p i = 1 + m i − q i − dq j (i = j ∈ {1, 2}) where
• p i is the price for one unit of service (say, e.g., one night per person in the accommodation), • q i and q j are the quantities of service provided respectively by suppliers i and j (these quantities can be thought of as the accommodation capacity, e.g., the number of rooms or of beds),
• d ∈ (0, 1) is an inverse measure of product differentiation between the services of the two suppliers (the lower d, the more services are differentiated; for d = 0, the two services are totally differentiated and the two demands are independent; at the other extreme, for d = 1, the two services are seen as perfectly substitutable), and • m i indicates the "market-exposure" (or brand recognition) of service i (the larger m i , the higher the willingness to pay of each consumer whatever the quantities q i and q j produced by the firms).
Before competingà la Cournot on the product market (i.e., suppliers simultaneously set their quantity, taking the quantity of the rival as given), suppliers observe the registration fee F charged by the intermediary and decide whether or not to register. Being listed on the intermediary's website has the effect of increasing the supplier's market exposure (with respect to self-promotion via other means). Moreover, infomediation generates network effects insofar as each supplier's exposure further increases when the other supplier also registers with the intermediary. As explained above, such network effects can be justified by scale and scope economies in promotional activities enjoyed by the intermediary, and because consumers are willing to pay more for both services when they are given the opportunity to compare them more easily. We translate this idea by assuming that m i = 0 when supplier i does not adhere to the intermediary, m i = m when supplier i is the only supplier who adheres to the intermediary, and m i = M when both suppliers adhere to the intermediary, with 0 < m < M.
The registration with the intermediary also lowers the cost of supplying accommodation. The supplier indeed outsources a share of its transaction costs to the intermediary. When an accommodation is on the intermediary's website for instance, the supplier does not have to promote its services anymore since it is already done by the intermediary. Let us remind that we assume here that the supplier does not have the opportunity to multihome since there exists only one intermediating platform. Accordingly, we denote the constant marginal cost of accommodation services by c for a supplier who does not register with the intermediary, and by γ for a supplier who does, and we assume γ < c < 1.
Production decisions
We start by solving the Cournot game suppliers play at stage 3. Supplier i's profit function can be written as π i = (1 + m i − q i − dq j )q i − c i q i . Setting to zero the derivative of profit with respect to q i , we derive supplier i's reaction function:
We proceed in the same way for the other supplier. Solving for the system of equations in two unknowns given by the two reaction functions, we find the Nash equilibrium quantities and profits:
In the above expression, the exact values of (m i , c i ) and (m j , c j ) depend on the adhesion decisions made by the suppliers at stage 2 (we note A for 'adhesion' and N for 'non adhesion'). There are three situations to consider.
• If no supplier adheres to the platform, then (m i , c i ) = (m j , c j ) = (0, c). Substituting these values into expression (1.1), we obtain the equilibrium profits, which are the same for the two suppliers:
• If supplier i adheres while supplier j does not, then (m i , c i ) = (m, γ) and (m j , c j ) = (0, c). In that case, the suppliers' equilibrium profits differ and are respectively given by 5
• Finally, if both suppliers adhere to the platform, then
We use again expression (1.1) to find the equilibrium profits for the two suppliers as
Coopetition
Before looking for the equilibrium adhesion decisions at stage 2, we want to illustrate what coopetition means in the present setting. As explained in the previous section, coopetition mixes some form of cooperation (which is translated here by the assumption that M > m, i.e. market exposure is larger when both suppliers register with the intermediary) and of competition (adhesion decisions are strategic, i.e. they are carried out with a view to affecting the environment in which product market competition is played). To assess how these two opposite forces balance each other, we compute how equilibrium profit changes when the other supplier also registers with the intermediary. That is, we compare π AN with π AA . Simple computations establish that:
Condition (1.2) says that each supplier welcomes the adhesion of the other supplier to the platform as long as this adhesion generates more benefits (on the lefthand side) than costs (on the right-hand side). The benefits (or the cooperation effect) stem from the increased exposure, (M − m), that affects the Cournot equilibrium quantity by a factor 2. The costs (or the competition effect) are due to the improved competitive position of the rival supplier: by adhering, the rival supplier boosts its exposure (from 0 to M) and reduces its marginal cost (from c to γ); the impact of these two effects on the Cournot equilibrium quantity are proportional to d. We thus see that the cooperation effect is more likely to dominate the competition effect (i) the larger the network effects (measured by the increased exposure, M − m) and (ii) the lower the intensity of competition between the two suppliers (measured by the degree of product substitutability, d).
Registration decisions
We now turn to stage 2 of the game and analyze the suppliers' decision to register with the intermediary. Supposing that supplier j does not register, supplier i prefers to register provided that
It is clear that each supplier is willing to pay a positive amount, i.e. F 1 > 0, to be the sole adherent to the intermediary, as it increases exposure (from 0 to m) and reduces marginal cost (from c to γ), without improving the rival firm's situation. Similarly, supposing now that supplier j does register, supplier i prefers to register as well provided that
As in the previous case, adhesion reduces marginal cost from c to γ. In terms of exposure, the effect is mixed. Compared to the previous case, the increase in exposure is larger (from 0 to M) but the rival supplier also benefits (its exposure increases from m to M). Yet, the former effect clearly dominates the latter, meaning that each supplier is also willing to pay a positive amount, i.e. F 2 > 0, to join the other supplier on the intermediary's platform. 6 The ranking of the two thresholds, F 1 and F 2 , depends on the parameter values. We need thus to distinguish between two cases. Case A: F 2 > F 1 . In that case, a supplier is willing to pay more for the intermediary's services when the two suppliers use them. This means that the cooperation effect dominates the competition effect. The Nash equilibrium of the second stage is then characterized as follows:
We observe that an intermediate fee (F 1 < F ≤ F 2 ) generates multiple equilibria (0 or 2 registrations). We are then in a typical coordination game: each supplier finds it optimal to mimic the choice of the other supplier because registration is worthwhile if it increases market exposure from m to M, but not from 0 to m. Case B: F 2 < F 1 . Here, a supplier is willing to pay more for the intermediary's services when it is the only one to use them. For that case to be observed, the competition effect must be sufficiently stronger than the cooperation effect (i.e., d must be large and (M − m) small). The Nash equilibrium of the second stage is then characterized as follows:
In contrast with Case A, we observe here that any fee set by the intermediary generates a unique equilibrium.
Intermediary's pricing decision
We are now in a position to derive the intermediary's optimal conduct in stage 1. We distinguish again between two cases. In Case A, the intermediary attracts either the two suppliers or none of them. He is sure to attract them if he sets F ≤ F 1 . If he raises the fee up to F 2 , he still has a chance of attracting the two suppliers, but this depends on the suppliers coordinating on this equilibrium. However, the suppliers might as well coordinate on the other equilibrium and refrain both from registering. If the intermediary is unable to coordinate the choices of the suppliers, it seems reasonable to predict that he will prefer to play it safe by setting F = F 1 . In Case B, the intermediary knows that to attract the two suppliers, it has to lower the registration fee from F 1 to F 2 (as each supplier is willing to pay less when the other supplier also joins). The intermediary finds it profitable to do so as long as 2F 2 > F 1 . Whether this inequality is satisfied or not depends on the parameter values.
Collecting the previous results, we can characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game as follows:
• if F 1 ≤ F 2 , the intermediary sets F = F 1 and the two suppliers register;
• if F 2 ≤ F 1 ≤ 2F 2 , the intermediary sets F = F 2 and the two suppliers register;
• if F 1 ≥ 2F 2 , the intermediary sets F = F 1 and only one supplier registers.
EMP vs OIP
The previous analysis can easily be enriched by considering that the intermediary can either be an EMP or an OIP. As argued in the previous sections, an EMP has both a transactional and informational role, while an OIP only has the latter. It seems thus reasonable to assume that an EMP generates a larger reduction in transaction costs for its adherents than an OIP. In the present model, we could write γ e < γ o , where the superscrits e and o refer respectively to an EMP and an OIP. A quick look at expressions (1.3) and (1.4) reveals that both F 1 and F 2 decrease with γ. Hence, we have F e 1 > F o 1 and F e 2 > F o 2 . This implies, not surprisingly, that an EMP is able to charge higher fees than an OIP. Alternatively, if an EMP charges the same fee as an OIP, it is able to capture a share of its members' profits by charging variable fees (i.e. a commission, up to the difference γ o − γ e ), without loosing adherents.
Extension to several suppliers
The previous model can be generalized to an arbitrary number of suppliers, N > 2, by letting the exposure parameter m i be equal to αn when supplier i adheres to the intermediary along with (n − 1) other suppliers (with α > 0) and, as before, equal to zero when supplier i does not adhere. Naturally, this increases the complexity of the model. So, to gain some insight, we compensate by simplifying the cost structure. In what follows, we assume that registration with the intermediary does not reduce the marginal cost of supplying accommodation; in particular, we pose c = γ = 0.
Under these assumptions, we can again solve for the subgame-perfect equilibria of the three-stage game. Supposing that n (with 0 < n < N) suppliers have joined the intermediary at stage 2 of the game, we denote by π in (n) the equilibrium profit at stage 3 of a typical supplier who joined the intermediary (and who is thus is among the n "in" suppliers); similarly, let π out (n) denote the equilibrium profit of a typical supplier who did not join the intermediary (and who is thus among the N − n "out" suppliers). 7 Let us first give a more precise assessment of the coopetition phenomenon. As above, we want to assess how a member's equilibrium profit changes when an additional supplier joins the intermediary. We therefore compute the difference π in (n + 1) − π in (n). Focusing here on the case of homogeneous products (i.e., d = 1), we can readily establish that the change in profit is positive if and only if the intermediary comprises less than half of the population of suppliers (i.e., if n < N/2). The corollary of this result is that, as the intermediary grows larger than this critical size, the equilibrium profit of each member decreases when an additional firm joins the intermediary. The intuition for this result is akin to the one we described in the case with two suppliers. In such a setting, the enlargement of the intermediary's member base induces two simultaneous contrasting effects on the members' profits: on the one hand, the members benefit from the increase in the demand they face (a positive "cooperation effect"), but on the other hand, they suffer from increased competition due to the increased demand that their competitors enjoy as well (a negative "competition effect"). As a result, there is a critical size after which the admission of new members on an electronic pltaform has an adverse effect on the initial members' profit. Now, turning to stage 1 of the game, we would like to measure how much a supplier is willing to pay in order to become the nth member of the intermediary. This supplier would be willing to pay up to its change in profits: f (n) ≡ π in (n) − π out (n − 1), i.e., the difference between the profit after joining the intermediary (when n suppliers are with the intermediary) and the profit before joining (when only n − 1 were with the intermediary). 8 The function f (n) can be interpreted as a demand function for the intermediary's services: for a given quantity of service (i.e., for a given number n of members), f (n) indicates the highest membership fee at which the service can be sold. The optimal level of the membership fee can thus be indirectly obtained by letting the intermediary select the optimal number of members, i.e., the number n * that maximizes the intermediary's profit, Π (n) = n f (n). Some line of computations establish that the first derivative of Π (n) with respect to n is negative at n = N. This implies that the intermediary never finds it profitable to induce full membership: the intermediary's optimum is to attract a strict subset of the existing pool of suppliers. The intuition for this result is again to be found in the coopetition phenomenon.
Discussion and research questions
In this paper, we introduce various business issues related to intermediation and electronic markets. First, even if intermediaries will continue to play a role in the digital economy, we note that they will be increasingly confronted to infomediation. Indeed, infomediaries emerge nowadays as a new category of intermediaries in a business context where buyers and sellers interact more easily with one another but still need to process a lot of information. Second, whether they are buyers or sellers, participants in the same electronic platform are in a particular position since they cooperate to the collective success of the platform while they remain competitors. We refer to the strategic concept of coopetition to describe this ambivalent reality. Third, we develop an economic model of an electronic platform built on industrial organization theory. The main analytical results drawn from this simple model are that (i) suppliers might suffer from the participation of other suppliers in the same platform (because the competition effect might be stronger than the cooperation effect), and (ii) the platform owner never finds it optimal to attract all suppliers.
To conclude our analysis, we propose several directions for future research. First, several empirical studies show the importance of the competing advantages related to the participation in an electronic platform [9] and of the integration of the Internet -and the ICT in general-to the strategy of the firm. However, if one considers the same market or common branch of industry, it is possible to meet several platforms that enter in competition [34] . This latter phenomenon can be seen as a move of competition from an individual dimension (agent against agent) to a collective dimension (platform against platform). In order to shed some light on this platform competition, we can rely on the industrial organization theory and its concept of two-sided market [21] [30] [2] . Indeed, with electronic platforms we are in the presence of positive indirect network effects since the more agents there are on one side of the platform (e.g., suppliers), the higher the agents' utility on the other side (e.g., buyers).
With respect to the model we developed in the previous section (with a single intermediary and several suppliers), the literature on two-sided markets offers two useful extensions. First, the buyers' side is explicitly modelled. That is, buyers also choose whether or not to register with a platform and their willingness to do so increases with the (expected) number of sellers present on the platform. 9 Second, several platforms compete to get both the suppliers and the buyers on board.
Concerning the latter issue, existing models examine the competition between two symmetric, possibily horizontally differentiated, platforms. However, this approach is not completely satisfactory for the tourism sector, as we observe two important additional complexities. First, the competition is between vertically differentiated platforms. That is, EMPs and OIPs target the same two groups (suppliers of accommodation and tourists) but offer different intermediation services, and may use different pricing modes. Second, buyers and sellers keep the opportunity to transact directly, i.e. without using the intermediation services provided by the platforms.
To the best of our knowledge, such issues have not been tackled so far in the literature (either in industrial organization or in strategy). We see thus there a promising area for future research. In particular, we identify a number of questions that should be investigated, both on theoretical and on empirical grounds:
• What are the best pricing strategies in the competition between vertically differentiated platforms? Is the high-quality platform able to charge higher prices on both sides of the market? Is the low-quality platform forced to pursue a niche strategy? • Since buyers and suppliers facing several platforms may decide to multihome, what does it imply for the competitive game among platforms? • Beyond competition between various types of platforms, there exist positive externalities between their activities, which are advantageous for each of them. What is the exact nature of such externalities and how do they affect competition?
